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The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS (continued)

1. Ms. WILLIAMS (Cyprus) said that her delegation shared the optimism expressed by other speakers with regard to progress in global and regional disarmament. As the Secretary-General had suggested in his report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", the only way to ensure progress towards enhanced security was through a comprehensive approach. The role of the United Nations and in particular the Security Council had already been considerably strengthened. Regional institutions were also becoming more involved in improving mechanisms for strengthening security. Those developments provided a genuine opportunity for achieving a comprehensive approach to international security. The agreement on cooperation between the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) reached earlier in 1993 had already borne fruit in the reinforcement of mechanisms for crisis management and the negotiation of further security and arms control measures. That was a good example of a partnership which promised further progress.

2. Her delegation agreed with the Secretary-General that the time had come for the practical integration of disarmament and arms regulation issues into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda. The role of arms control and disarmament in the future would mainly lie in the field of preventive diplomacy and would be judged by their contribution to the elaboration of an effective conflict prevention strategy. That strategy would have to be based on two tenets of international law: the prohibition of the threat or use of force directed against the territorial or political integrity of any country, and the corresponding obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means. The primary object of arms control agreements should be to make it more difficult to deploy aggressive military force. That should be done by constraining military activities; the more closely knit the system of rules became, the more difficult it would be to embark on aggression without violating obligations.

3. There could be no doubt, however, that a modern concept of security must be able to include legal, economic, social and ecological concerns. A lasting peace would only be established if all dimensions of security, including economic, political and human rights, were guaranteed. Her delegation pledged its active participation and support towards the attainment of those goals.

4. Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands), speaking as Chairman of the Panel of Governmental Technical Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, introduced the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (A/48/344). In the aftermath of the Gulf War, there had been consensus in the international community that the world must avoid excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons and that greater transparency would help to rectify misconceptions and enable nations to exercise restraint. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was the instrument for fulfilling that objective. The Register was not designed to assess the overall capabilities of States nor a measure for controlling arms

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

transfers, but expressed the political determination of Member States to enhance confidence among themselves.

5. The Panel of Governmental Experts established in 1992 to elaborate the technical procedures and make any adjustments to the Annex to General Assembly resolution 46/36 L necessary for the effective operation of the Register, and to prepare a report on the modalities for early expansion of the scope of the Register, had submitted a first report (A/47/342) to the General Assembly setting out a clear set of technical procedures for the operation of the Register and a standardized reporting form, and exploring possible further development of the Register. The Secretary-General's current report on the Register (A/48/344) had been compiled on the basis of the information on pertinent transactions relating to 1992 provided by Member States and summarized the replies of 80 Member States, including all the major arms suppliers. Eight more returns had been received since its preparation. The returns covered some 200 arms transfers, amounting to a significant part of the total number of legal arms transfers for 1992 in the categories covered by the Register. That could be considered a good and promising start.

6. The data available through the Register created transparency on conventional arms transfers and thus contributed to building confidence among States. Moreover, being Government-supplied, the data had official status. Information had been provided on arms transfers in each of the seven categories of the Register, and almost half of the returns included background information. The same proportion of States had submitted data on military holdings and procurement through national production, and many States had provided an insight into their national arms import and export policies, legislation and administrative procedures. It was another beneficial consequence of reporting to the Register that it might well cause some nations to do the necessary amount of internal soul-searching.

7. The returns to the Register so far, including the "nil" returns, were an expression of firm support for the concept embodied in the Register. They also provided highly relevant data. In that connection, he appealed for timely returns, as, in order to provide the maximum amount of transparency and confidence, the Register should be up to date.

8. Apart from their number, the quality of the returns required attention. There was, for instance, the matter of discrepancies evidenced by cross-checking the reported exports and imports of Member States. However, that aspect was not purely negative, as such mismatches indicated at least that returns were genuine, rather than preconcerted. Moreover, solutions to individual discrepancies could be found through consultations between the Member States concerned.

9. The initial performance of the Register was impressive. However, if it was to become a powerful factor for building confidence and trust among Member States, maximum participation in the form of returns, including "nil" returns, was a political sine qua non. Member States which had not yet participated in the Register should do so without further delay. Participation in the Register stimulated cooperation at regional and subregional levels, thereby contributing

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

to stability in all regions of the world, as was evidenced by the important regional and subregional initiatives that had already been taken.

10. The contents of the returns indicated that the functioning of the Register warranted qualitative examination, particularly with regard to the categories of arms transfers. Not all the returns conformed fully with the seven categories established for arms transfers, although for the Register to be objective and non-discriminatory its contents should be in full conformity with those categories and their definitions. In some cases, definitions might need further adjustment, for example, those of combat aircraft and attack helicopters, the threshold in the definition of warships and the definition of missiles and missile launchers.

11. Another more technical question was whether the standardized form for the reporting of arms transfers needed modification. For example, some Member States had anticipated the future development of the Register by using the standardized reporting form to submit information on their military holdings and on procurement through national production. The 1994 Experts Group might usefully address the phenomenon of discrepancies between returns, exploring whether means could be found to help reduce their number, for instance by the gradual harmonization of national administrative procedures. To that end, the experts might develop greater agreement on what constituted an arms transfer in terms of the Register. Attention should be given to those technical aspects of the Register in order to reduce inaccuracies and inconsistencies, the accumulation of which might undermine confidence and reinforce suspicions about intentions. Apart from those aspects, which concerned the operation of the Register in its present form, the 1994 Experts Group should consider the further development of the Register, for example, the possibility of reporting on additional weapons not currently registered or including more details on particular arms transfers. Of course, overloading of the Register should be avoided. Requiring less detailed reports in the first years of its operation might induce additional States to participate. It should also be borne in mind, however, that there was wide support among Member States for including in the Register relevant data on holdings and arms procurement through national production. Certainly, the Register could gradually be developed along such more ambitious lines, and might in due course evolve into the unique early-warning mechanism it had the potential of becoming.

12. A number of interesting thoughts and proposals on the present and future functioning of the Register had been put forward in 1993, for example, that States should begin exchanging information on military holdings and procurement through national production and that they should make an annual declaration to the United Nations on the size and organization of their military forces. The discussions within the Conference on Disarmament on that subject were quite promising.

13. Summing up, he said that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was well on its way to becoming the effective instrument for the strengthening of international security Member States had hoped to create. What was needed to bring it to its full capacity as such an instrument was the cooperation of all Member States in living up to their commitments.

14. Mr. YATIV (Israel) said that the Middle East region had taken historic and dramatic steps towards peace and reconciliation as a result of recent developments at the International Peace Conference. Discussions at the Conference concerning the unique security situation prevailing in the Middle East had underlined the need to take into account the concerns and interests of all countries of the region in developing solutions to outstanding security problems. Consequently, confidence-building measures must take precedence over the arms control process in the region. For its part, Israel, had been pursuing confidence-building activities with its neighbours within the working group on regional security and arms control, which was part of the multilateral track of the Conference. The activities had included a workshop on verification held in Cairo, and workshops with extra-regional countries serving as mentors on communications-related confidence-building measures, search and rescue at sea, pre-notification and exchange of information on military exercises, and long-range objectives. Israel welcomed the progress made in the international talks, and hoped that Syria and Lebanon would join that important forum.

15. It had become clear in the wake of the Gulf War that excessive accumulation of weapons arsenals was a major source of instability in the region and that conventional weapons often caused no less destruction than non-conventional weapons. A special effort thus needed to be made to curb arms supplies to the Middle East. In that context, Israel supported General Assembly resolution 47/52 L concerning "Transparency in armaments", and had submitted information to the Register of Conventional Arms.

16. With respect to the question of chemical weapons, Israel regarded the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free region in the Middle East as an achievable goal and one of the main objectives of its foreign policy. In accordance with that position, Israel supported the goals of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and had been among the first group of States to sign the Convention in January of 1993. There was need for more general compliance with the provisions of the Convention, and its universality must also be guaranteed in terms of the right to membership in the governing bodies established by it.

17. While Israel supported the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and had voted in favour of the NPT in 1968, it believed that an agreement regarding a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which would be freely and directly negotiated among the States of the region, including mutual verification arrangements, would be a more suitable approach to eliminating nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Furthermore, it was Israel's view that the nuclear issue should be dealt with only within the full context of the peace process, as well as other regional security problems. Nevertheless, Israel supported the work of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT review conference.

18. Recent developments in the peace process provided an important opportunity to settle regional problems and to achieve peace and stability in the Middle East. However, matters of security could be settled only among the States of the region. The evolving situation must be used to enhance regional security by building confidence between States in the region and diminishing levels of suspicion and hostility. That process deserved all the support and

(Mr. Yativ, Israel)

encouragement of the international community, and for that reason Israel welcomed the participation of States outside of the region in the multilateral talks on regional security and arms control.

19. Lastly, the dramatic changes taking place in the Middle East should lead to a reappraisal of the positions and resolutions of the United Nations in order to bring them into accord with the new realities of the region. For example, Israel believed that the agenda item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" should be struck from the agenda.

20. Mr. TAAPOPI (Namibia) observed that, given the recent accentuation of political, religious and ethnic rivalries, the failure to curb weapons of mass destruction would be a source of global instability. The nuclear States and the entire international community had a moral obligation to prevent their spread by concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) that was universal, verifiable, multilaterally negotiated and of indefinite duration, thus helping to halt the qualitative arms race and preventing other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Consequently, the recent decision of the Conference on Disarmament to instruct its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to negotiate such a treaty was commendable.

21. Namibia had signed, and was in the process of ratifying, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, a major breakthrough in arms control. It had also acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and hoped that would augur well for the prospect of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and it was making arrangements to join the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

22. In Africa, where violence and dialogue were the two extremes by which the degree of trust between States could be gauged, the issue of regional confidence-building was crucial. The Namibian Government had in February 1993 hosted a regional meeting on confidence- and security-building measures in southern Africa, which had proved useful in discussing issues common to the region and in dispelling mistrust. As further steps, outstanding disputes should now be settled by negotiation, regular meetings should be held among military officials of different countries, and information should be exchanged about military forces and activities within the region. The resulting confidence would allow armed forces to be reduced and resources to be redirected from military to civilian purposes. Owing to their debt burdens, the developing countries had not yet benefited from any peace dividend, and the industrialized countries must apply some of the benefits from disarmament to their development.

23. Mr. MEHR (Afghanistan) said that in view of the particular situation in the Middle East, his delegation would support any initiative aimed at averting the disastrous and far-reaching consequences of a nuclear war and urged all other nations in the region to do likewise by adhering to the NPT. In the post-cold-war era the concept of a nuclear deterrent was no longer a valid argument, and countries should focus their efforts on peacemaking, confidence-building measures and negotiations. In that connection, steps towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would strengthen general support for the extension of the NPT after 1995.

(Mr. Mehr, Afghanistan)

24. Afghanistan had always supported the activities of the United Nations in arms control and disarmament, and recognized that the security of Member States could be guaranteed through compliance with the relevant treaties and conventions, particularly those relating to verification and transparency.

25. Afghanistan welcomed the opening for signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention and looked forward to its earliest possible entry into force. It also endorsed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a CTBT. With regard to the NPT, his delegation supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty and called upon all nuclear-weapon States to observe the moratorium on nuclear testing initiated by the Russian Federation and the United States. As to the question of military transparency, he stressed the usefulness of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and urged countries in his region to submit their reports without delay.

26. The possibility of a nuclear arms race in South Asia was a matter of grave concern. Negotiations between the countries concerned should be encouraged, and the possibility of a draft treaty for a nuclear-weapon-free zone along the lines of that agreed upon by the ASEAN countries should be considered. Moreover, the threat posed to global security by the build-up of conventional weapons should not be overlooked, hence Afghanistan's support for a resolution to control the production and sale of such weapons. Effective international action was required so as to place restrictions on the sale and distribution of conventional weapons and to bring an end to their illegal transfer. More important, a strategy should be worked out for collecting the illegally distributed weapons that were a source of instability in a number of developing countries.

27. His delegation attached particular importance to the holding of a review conference on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. It hoped that the Second Protocol to the Convention would be revised to make more adequate provision for the problems created by the widespread use of mines, which were felt so acutely in his country.

28. Mr. WAQANISAU (Fiji) said that small developing nations appreciated the fact that the powerful nations had taken the lead in seeking to foster international peace and security. The South Pacific Forum countries urged nuclear-weapon States to continue to negotiate disarmament and arms limitation treaties, on the premise that weapons must be understood as a threat to life rather than as tools of warfare to be used politically in the interests of security.

29. Fiji welcomed the current moratoriums on nuclear testing by France, Russia and the United States. The recent United States extension of its moratorium was a welcome relief to Fiji and the other island nations of the South Pacific, which had for decades been exposed to nuclear testing and which looked forward to a treaty that would codify a total and permanent ban on all testing. The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiation of a CTBT was a historic development, and all nuclear Powers should participate in the negotiations.

(Mr. Waqanisau, Fiji)

30. Fiji, like other members of the South Pacific Forum, fully supported indefinite extension of the NPT. All negotiations on the transfer of high technology with military applications under the NPT must take into account existing non-proliferation treaties and arrangements. The recent initiatives by some Member States aimed at declaring the use of nuclear weapons illegal would not solve the proliferation problem.

31. On the question of transparency in armaments, Fiji supported the proposals to extend the scope of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include the transfer of high technology with military applications and weapons of mass destruction. The Register, being low-key, incremental and long-term, had the potential to be an effective instrument of preventive diplomacy.

32. The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Fiji had become a party, had been a significant step forward. Biological weapons, however, remained a global threat because of their dual use and because they could be produced relatively easily, cheaply and on a small scale, thus making them attractive to countries without a nuclear capability. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction had no provision for verification, and a conference should be convened to consider the report of the Third Review Conference of that Convention.

33. Regional disarmament and arms limitation agreements freely arrived at among the States concerned should lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and ultimately to a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. The major Powers should contribute to the indefinite extension of the NPT when it was reviewed in 1995, just as they should respect regional disarmament arrangements. Using the South Pacific, for instance, which under the Treaty of Raratonga had been declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone, to dump nuclear wastes or as a thoroughfare to move nuclear materials was contrary to the terms of that Treaty and showed a blatant disregard for the wishes of States in the region.

34. It was obvious that science and technology were directly related to the economic and social development of countries, and the Committee must work with other disarmament agencies to issue viable guidelines and recommendations on the matter. The lead taken by the nuclear Powers in relation to a nuclear test ban, nuclear non-proliferation, the control of chemical and biological weapons and of nuclear waste dumping in the North Pacific augured well for the development of the island nations of the South Pacific.

35. Mr. TUN (Myanmar) observed that the propitious international political climate had favoured arms control and disarmament, prompting the conclusion of negotiations that had been going on for more than two decades. Among the most significant achievements was the decision in August 1993 of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTBT, which Myanmar had long advocated as a central disarmament and non-proliferation objective. It hoped that the Conference would be in a position to complete its work by the time of the review of the NPT in 1995. The timely conclusion of a CTBT would demonstrate the seriousness with which the nuclear-weapon States viewed the commitment they had undertaken as parties to the NPT.

(Mr. Tun, Myanmar)

36. The Chemical Weapons Convention had already been signed by an impressive number of States, among them Myanmar. Yet the Convention was but a first step, and much more needed to be done to implement its provisions. The momentum must be maintained, and more States should accede to the Treaty in order to ensure a global ban on chemical weapons.

37. The prospects for nuclear disarmament had brightened considerably in recent years, since Washington and Moscow had at long last begun to rein in the unbridled nuclear arms race. The satisfactory implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the signing of the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-I) and the agreement undertaken by the principal nuclear Powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals were encouraging developments. Moreover, the adoption of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) in January 1933, provided for the most sweeping nuclear-arms reduction in history.

38. Universal adherence to the NPT was a means of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The remaining non-signatory States would be encouraged to accede when the nuclear-weapon States demonstrated their unequivocal commitment to negotiate in good faith on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. The success of the 1995 review conference would depend on whether all NPT parties believed that the five nuclear States had made sufficient progress to that end. Meanwhile, non-nuclear-weapon States must be given credible security assurances through legally binding guarantees against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

39. Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary) said that the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament had made remarkable progress, notably in its decision to commence negotiations on a CTBT. He expressed the hope that agreement could be reached on expanding the membership of the Conference before its next session.

40. He welcomed the growing interest in and recognition of the benefits of transparency in armaments through the success of initiatives including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Although the Secretary-General's initial report on the Register had indicated that reports had been received from less than half of the Member States, it was worthwhile noting that the information they provided, for instance on arms exports, covered more than 90 per cent of the global aggregate. In order to make the Register more representative, any geographical imbalances in reporting should be remedied and States whose statistics were likely to be of regional significance should be encouraged to submit their reports. Further contributions to the Register would enhance confidence-building not only worldwide, but also at the regional level. Moreover, while transparency in armaments should essentially be a cooperative undertaking, it should not preclude the possibility of unilateral action.

41. The reliability of the information provided was also an important aspect. To that end, he suggested looking into the possibility of establishing a monitoring or review mechanism along the lines of those set up for the purposes of other non-binding international instruments. One of the main objectives of transparency in armaments was to prevent any further deterioration in global security; however, international action for that purpose could not be taken

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

until a criterion for judging whether the amount of arms accumulated posed a serious threat had been established.

42. The growing interest in transparency in armaments had been amply demonstrated during the Conference on Disarmament through the numerous contributions provided by delegations. Regrettably, due to time constraints it had not been possible then, and apparently would not be possible in the near future to give the ideas put forward the consideration they warranted. For that reason, the Hungarian delegation considered that the topic should remain on the arms control and disarmament agenda, including that of the Conference on Disarmament, for many years to come.

43. With regard to the possibility of a CTBT, he welcomed the substantial progress made in the study of non-seismic verification methods, and looked forward to the resumption of negotiations on the subject the following year. Hungary had always been in favour of a total ban on nuclear explosions and therefore advocated the earliest possible conclusion of a CTBT, for it was not only global security but also the future of the environment that was at stake. A total ban meant that no distinction should be drawn between nuclear-weapons tests and nuclear explosions. Furthermore, the possibility of prohibiting associated preparatory activities, as well as assistance to other countries in conducting their nuclear tests, should also be considered. The planned treaty must be applicable to all States, regardless of whether they possessed nuclear weapons.

44. Experience had shown that the success of any disarmament agreement depended to a great extent on a proper verification system. Hungary considered that verification of the CTBT should be a technical rather than a political issue. Advantage should be taken of the strides made in technology to ensure a comprehensive and reliable verification system. It would largely be based on a seismic monitoring network, but should also be supplemented by non-seismic verification means in order to ensure the required level of confidence in States compliance with the treaty. A further and more detailed examination of the different aspects of the complementary verification techniques would be necessary with a view to their possible integration into a single system.

45. Such a system must meet three basic requirements. First, it must be technically effective in order to reveal potential non-compliance and act as a credible deterrent against prohibited activities. Second, it must be cost-effective and not entail heavy financial burdens for States parties. In that connection, the possibility of allocating certain responsibilities in the implementation process to IAEA might be considered. Third, the verification system should be as transparent as possible, with equal access to data guaranteed for all States parties. Lastly, a related problem was that of making political judgements on the degree of compliance with the treaty by States parties. A policy along the lines of that adopted in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention should be envisaged.

46. There was no doubt that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have an important bearing on other disarmament matters; for instance, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime would certainly benefit greatly from a

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comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions. However, care should be taken to avoid creating an artificial link between the two areas. Experience had shown that the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the outcome of the CTBT negotiations could be seriously jeopardized if such an exercise were attempted. Moreover, although developments in the second half of the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament augured well for swift progress during the 1994 session, the setting of an arbitrary deadline seemed to be premature. He was none the less confident that the Conference on Disarmament would rise to the challenge and complete its work successfully.

47. Archbishop MARTINO (Observer for the Holy See) said that the warfare, brutality and atrocities scarring many regions of the world provided a shocking contrast to the achievements in the disarmament field in the wake of the cold war. In the absence of strong world mechanisms for peace, a nefarious arms trade continued and arms production was excused, even encouraged, for economic reasons. The lack of political machinery for peace had its origins in the lack of a shared awareness of the repercussions of social injustice caused by the demands of powerful States in a world of finite resources.

48. He welcomed the Committee's decision to combine its debates on questions of disarmament and international security and called on all Committee members to act more energetically in pursuit of the goals of disarmament, peaceful settlement of disputes, more balanced development of the world economy. He also welcomed the strategy described by the Secretary-General in his Agenda for Peace of combining the elements of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building, and called upon all States to make participation in and support for international peace-keeping a part of their foreign and national security policies.

49. With regard to the question of nuclear weapons, he congratulated those States which had participated in the moratorium on nuclear testing and called upon the Committee to take up as its goal implementation of a permanent, global ban on nuclear testing by all countries in all environments. That goal must be met in time to ensure the successful extension of the NPT in 1995.

50. Fresh insights into the intellectual foundations of nuclear deterrence policies in the wake of the cold war showed that nuclear-arms reductions were not sufficient to guarantee security. After the collapse of communism as an international force, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of the United Nations peace-keeping and peacemaking machinery, the world community was confronted with the challenge of moving to a post-nuclear form of security based on strengthened international law. In that regard, he noted that the NPT complemented the United Nations Charter by addressing the problems of the atom and development. In essence, the NPT promised a world in which nuclear weapons would be eliminated and technological cooperation for development would be widespread. However, in recent years a widening gap had emerged between the promise and the performance of the world community, and quinquennial reviews of the Treaty had become confrontational. Successful extension of the NPT beyond 1995 would depend on the compliance of near-nuclear States, which were increasingly dismayed by what they considered to be the deception of the nuclear Powers. For their part, the nuclear Powers bore the responsibility of stopping the development of nuclear weapons before the

(Archbishop Martino, Observer, Holy See)

technology would become available for use in regional conflicts. In any case, it was possible to reduce the discriminatory nature of the NPT through such measures as a comprehensive test ban.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.